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NOTES
REBUILDING THE CITADEL: STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
TO ACCOUNTANT NON-PRIVITY SUITS
Nearly sixty years ago, in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,1
Chief Judge Cardozo distinguished a negligent audit from a defective
product and held that privity of contract was required to hold an ac-
countant' liable for negligence.3 Recently, several jurisdictions have
eroded the privity doctrine by applying the expanded liability principles
of product liability law4 to negligent accountants. 5 Conversely, other
states have expressly reaffirmed the accountant privity doctrine.6 In
many states where the courts have not recently taken a stand, account-
ants, clients, and third party users of financial statements are in the un-
comfortable position of'not knowing which standard the courts will
apply in future cases.7
1. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
2. In general usage, "accountant" typically refers to anyone who figures and records financial
data. Accountants can be either internal, meaning the organization for whom they keep records
employs them, or external, meaning the organization hires them to inspect the work of the organiza-
tion's internal accountants. As used in this Note, the term "accountant" refers to an external audi-
tor hired by the organization to express an opinion regarding the propriety of the organization's
financial records.
3. Fifteen years prior to Ultramares, Cardozo helped initiate the abolition of the privity re-
quirement for product liability, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916). See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. See generally Priest, The Invention of Enter-
prise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 461 (1985); Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CM. L. REV. 184
(1987).
5. States that have rejected the privity requirement for accountant negligence have adopted
either the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard, see infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text, or
the foreseeability rule, see infra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
7. The issue becomes more important as investors and creditors increasingly look to the ac-
countant after a business failure. "In the past 15 years, more suits have been filed against account-
ants than in the entire previous history of the profession." Miller, Avoiding Lawsuits, J. ACCT., Sept.
1988, at 57. Recent examples of accountants forced into the role of defendant upon business failure
are the Federal Home Loan Bank Board suits filed against three of the nation's largest accounting
firms in connection with financial irregularities at troubled savings and loan instituions. Although
no accountant criminal activity is alleged, the Bank Board is seeking several million dollars in dam-
ages from the accountants. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 1. Troubles in the savings and loan
industry and the resulting federal bailouts have "produced a search for someone to blame." Id.
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In an effort to provide certainty to all parties concerned, three state
legislatures have passed accountant privity statutes8 that define the scope
of an accountant's duty of care to third parties.9 This Note examines the
need for accountant-privity statutes. Part I examines the roots of the
traditional privity requirement, and its application in the context of ac-
countant negligence. Part II evaluates the arguments on both sides of the
recent judicial erosion of the accountant privity requirement. Part III
identifies and analyzes state legislative responses to the expansion by
some courts of the accountant's duty of care.
I. PRIVITY REQUIREMENT FOR ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY
A1. Accountant Liability
Of the wide range of accountant services, legal liability most frequently
arises in the context of an audit engagement. 1 Financial statements are
not prepared during an audit. Rather, the accountant merely reviews the
accuracy of the client's statements,"' while client management remains
primarily responsible for financial statement accuracy.12 The financial
statement certification states that the accountant has conducted the audit
"in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards"' 3 to obtain
Because the client is often insolvent, the accountant is frequently the only party from whom recovery
is possible.
8. See infra notes 137-162 and accompanying text.
9. Third parties include any user of the financial statements other than the client who con-
tracts with the accountant. Typically, third parties use financial statements to assess the financial
strength of the client. Suppliers, creditors, and investors are examples of third parties who use a
client's financial statements.
10. Other services accountants frequently provide include tax advice, tax return preparation,
management consulting, and litigation support. However, the vast majority of cases that test the
privity requirement involve an audit. See infra notes 54 and 59.
11. In order to improve the public understanding of the auditor's role in an audit engagement,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the self-governing body for ac-
countants, recently issued Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial
Statements. The first paragraph of the new audit opinion, now accompanying every accountant
certification, explicitly defines the roles of client and auditor: "These financial statements are the
responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these
financial statements based on our audits." Roussey, Ten Eyck & Blanco-Best, Three New SASs:
Closing the Communications Gap, J. AccT., Dec. 1988, at 44, 45-46.
12. In re Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 721 (1939). "Management does not dis-
charge its [responsibility for the accuracy of financial statements] . . . by the employment of in-
dependent public accountants, however reputable." Id.
13. Roussey, Ten Eyck & Blanco-Best, supra note 1I, at 45. Generally accepted auditing stan-
dards (GAAS) are professional standards promulgated by the AICPA. These standards establish
the objectives of an audit and the expected quality of performance. The AICPA periodically issues
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"'reasonable assurance [that] the statements are free of material misstate-
ment . . . [and are] in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles." 4
Accountant liability can arise when an accountant performs an audit
negligently. Although the audit certification does not purport to guaran-
tee financial solvency, 5 the accountant must perform with the skill and
knowledge normally possessed by other accountants. 6 An audit is negli-
gent if the accountant fails to apply generally accepted auditing stan-
dards and consequently certifies a financial statement that does not
conform with generally accepted accounting principles.
Accountant negligence does not necessarily render the accountant lia-
ble to all who have read the certification. Review by an accountant does
not relieve clients of their duty to produce accurate financial state-
ments.1 7 Consequently, injured third parties usually have a fraud or neg-
ligent misrepresentation claim against the client."8 However, because
significant recovery from an insolvent client is unlikely, third party finan-
cial statement users frequently attempt to recover from the accountant.
Liability to all third parties would place an enormous burden on the ac-
counting profession because an unknown number of readers may use the
financial statements for an indeterminate number of transactions, thereby
creating an inestimable amount of accountant exposure. t9 Recognition
Statements on Auditing Standards (SASs) which interpret GAAS. W. KELL & R. ZIEGLER, MOD-
ERN AUDITING 4 (2d ed. 1983). The AICPA sanctions accountants who do not apply GAAS when
conducting an audit. GAAS is "used by peers, courts, and regulatory agencies in evaluating the
auditor's performance." Id. Thus, departure from GAAS subjects the accountant to legal liability
as well as professional sanctions.
14. Roussey, Ten Eyck & Blanco-Best, supra note 11, at 45. Generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) are established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The
FASB periodically issues Statements of FinancialAccounting Concepts which "set forth fundamental
concepts on which financial accounting and reporting standards will be based." G. WELSCH, C.
ZLATKOVICH & W. HARRISON, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 4 (6th ed. 1982). The FASB also
issues interpretations of pre-existing GAAP. Thus, the FASB adapts GAAP to meet the changing
accounting requirements of the dynamic business environment. As with GAAS, an accountant who
fails to apply GAAP during an audit is subject to both legal liability and professional sanctions by
the AICPA.
15. The phrase "reasonable assurance" in the financial statement certification is meant to ac-
knowledge the accountant's responsibility to provide reasonable, as opposed to absolute, assurance
that the statements are free of material misstatements.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1979).
17. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
18. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1929, 1932 (1988).
19. Mednick, Accountants Liability: Coping With the Stampede to the Courtroom, J. ACCT.,
1989]
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of this hardship is the traditional justification for the privity requirement
in accountant negligence suits.20
B. Privity Requirement
The privity doctrine has its roots in the English case of Winterbottom
v. Wright.2" Under the Winterbottom privity rule, an injured third party
had no cause of action against a defendant performing under a contract
unless the contract was made for the benefit of that third party.22 Early
American courts widely accepted the privity requirement as a means to
prevent limitless liability.2 3 However, Judge Cardozo's landmark opin-
ion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.24 effectively rejected the privity
defense for negligence claims involving defective products.25  The Mac-
Pherson rule is now a settled principle. 26 A negligent manufacturer is
liable for any personal injuries proximately caused by his negligence.
The privity defense, however, is still available in several jurisdictions
when the plaintiff suffers only economic harm.27 Courts and commenta-
tors have expressed concern that allowing recovery for economic dam-
ages without requiring privity may result in excessive levels of liability,
exaggerated assessment of damages, and an increase in fraudulent
Sept. 1987, at 121 ("The number of third parties who might use the results of the accountant's work
is exponentially greater than the number of actual clients.").
20. See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the traditional justifications
for the privity requirement. But see infra notes 50-83 and accompanying text for contrary
arguments.
21. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
22. In Winterbottom, the court noted that "[u]nless we confine the operation of. . . contracts
... to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I
can see no limit, would ensue." 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
23. See J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 652-53 (2d ed. 1981).
24. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
25. The erosion of the privity requirement in product liability cases actually began before Mac-
Pherson. See, e.g., Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478 (1909); Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470
(1882); Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870); Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See
generally, R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 413-35
(1984).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1977).
27. Thus, privity remains a defense where injuries are of a purely economic nature, even in
product liability law, where the privity requirement has been universally rejected for personal inju-
ries. See Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Products
Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. 647 (1977); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss:
A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985); Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law:
The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (1986).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/13
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claims.2 8 This concern may explain the retention of the privity require-
ment for accountant negligence when reliant third parties seek damages
for purely economic injuries.
Fifteen years after MacPherson, Judge Cardozo, writing in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,29 acknowledged that harm from a defective
audit was foreseeable,30 but declined to abandon the privity requirement
in the context of accountant negligence. In Ultramares, a third party
who relied on a certified balance sheet was denied recovery from a negli-
gent accountant. The accountant knew the client used the balance sheet
in the usual course of business but did not know the extent to which third
parties would rely on the accountant's certification. Cardozo distin-
guished accountant liability from product liability in MacPherson and
expressed apprehension about uncertainties that result from allowing re-
covery for purely economic harm without privity of contract:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class. The hazards... are so extreme as to enkin-
dle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that
exposes to these consequences.
3 1
The Ultramares holding, however, does not preclude all third party
recovery for negligently inflicted economic losses. Ultramares specifi-
cally reaffirmed Glanzer v. Shepard,32 an earlier Cardozo opinion that
extended the duty of care to reliant third parties when "the end and aim
of the transaction" was to provide information to that party.33 In
28. See Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1943-45. See generally Rabin, supra note 27. The Supreme
Court has refused to allow recovery for economic damages absent privity in the securities context.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35 (1975) ("a putative plaintiff, who
neither purchases nor sells securities but sues instead for intangible economic injury . is more
likely to be seeking a largely conjectural and speculative recovery").
29. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
30. Cardozo noted that the accountants "knew ... that in the usual course of business the
balance sheet when certified would be exhibited by the... [client] to banks, creditors, stockholders,
purchasers, or sellers, according to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings." Id.
at 173-74, 174 N.E. at 442.
31. Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. The Supreme Court has also questioned the wisdom of
extending indeterminate liability for economic loss in the securities context: "[w]e are not the first
court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff [sic] who may sue in
this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good." (citing Ultramares). Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-48.
32. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
33. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
1989]
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Glanzer, a bean purchaser recovered for the negligence of a public
weigher hired by the seller to weigh beans and provide a report to the
purchaser. The court in Ultramares distinguished the duty to third par-
ties in the "end and aim" situation of Glanzer from the relationship that
existed between the accountant and the indeterminate class of persons
who might rely on the audit.34 Thus, read together, Ultramares and
Glanzer acknowledge a duty to third parties only if the statements were
intended to benefit that third party.35
Under Ultramares, the privity defense extended only to third-party
claims for negligence. The accountant owes a duty to both the client and
third parties to perform his services without fraud36 or gross negli-
gence.37 Although third parties can expect that an accountant's state-
ment is neither fraudulent nor recklessly prepared, the court in
Ultramares stated that liability for mere negligence requires a contract;
specifically, it expressed "doubt whether the average business man [sic]
receiving a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one
of a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything more. "38
Other state courts 39 uniformly followed Ultramares for more than
thirty years4 before some courts began eroding the accountant-privity
34. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. "[W]hile actual foresight of reliance by a
specific third party might displace privity as a trigger for liability, the mere objective foreseeability of
such reliance would not suffice to establish an accountant's liability in negligence for economic losses
suffered by reliant third parties." Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1936.
35. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 337-38, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (1983).
36. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. Cardozo noted that "[fjraud includes the
pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none." d.
37. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. The Ultramares holding does not relieve accountants from
liability for negligence so gross "as to justify a finding that [the accountant] had no genuine belief in
[the statement's] adequacy." Id.
38. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. For a discussion of third-party expectations, see infra notes
115-23 and accompanying text.
39. The issue of accountant privity arises only in state law cases because privity is not an ele-
ment in suits against accountants under the federal securities laws. For example, under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1981), only direct purchasers of the securities initially issued
under the registration statement may sue "experts" such as accountants.
The Securities Act of 1934, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1981), establishes civil liability for any person
who makes a false or misleading statement of a material fact on an SEC filing. Similarly, an implied
cause of action exists against against accountants under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1981). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
For a brief overview of accountant liability under federal law, see Note, Accountant Liability to
Third Parties: To What Extent is Comparative Negligence a Defense?, 55 UMKC L. REV. 608, 621-
24 (1987).
40. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1936.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss3/13
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doctrine.4' The ensuing abandonment of Ultramares, however, was not
complete. Several state courts have recently reaffirmed the privity re-
quirement in accountant negligence cases.4 2
II. JUDICIAL EROSION OF THE PRIVITY REQUIREMENT
Erosion of the privity requirement for accountant negligence began in
the late 1960s, during a period of general tort liability expansion. Every
jurisdiction "stormed the citadel" and rejected the privity defense for de-
fective product claims;43 commentators and courts began to accept the
expanded liability theories of tort reform.' By the late 1960s, commen-
tators began to suggest the expansion of accountant liability.45 Subse-
quently, courts that have questioned the privity requirement of
Ultramares have taken one of two approaches: the Restatement rule46 or
the foreseeability rule.47 Nevertheless, despite widespread judicial ap-
proval and numerous attempts in the literature to justify expanded ac-
countant liability, 48 the arguments advanced in support of each approach
41. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1987); Idaho Bank &
Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985).
43. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 424-25
(1984). Because the privity requirement had been universally accepted, the erosion of the privity
defense is often referred to as "storming the citadel."
44. "[T]ort reform emphasiz[ed] the benefits of expansive liability .... This growth was re-
flected in the development of a rich body of scholarly literature, judicial dissatisfaction with privity
defenses and warranty disclaimers in the products context, and the emergence of strict liability as the
dominant regime for defective products." Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1937. See also Owen, Rethink-
ing the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980); Priest, The Invention of
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985); Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 184 (1987).
45. Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants'Liability to the Public, 18
DE PAUL L. REV. 56 (1968); Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate
Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139 (1968).
46. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Besser, Privity? - An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third
Parties, 7 SETON HALL 507 (1976); Fiflis, Current Problems ofAccountants'Responsibilities to Third
Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975); Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liability to
Third Parties, 23 CASE W. RES. 113, 117-22 (1971); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of
Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 398-404 (1939); Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of
Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 56 (1968); Weiner, Common Law Liability
of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233
(1983); Note, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an Auditor's
Legal Duty, 48 ALA. L. REV. 876 (1984); Comment, Adjusting Accountants' Liability for Negligence:
Washington University Open Scholarship
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are not irrefutable.49 Consequently, the debate continues, leaving the ac-
countants and third parties uncertain in states where the courts have not
recently addressed the issue.
A. Restatement' Position and the Foreseeability Rule
The Restatement50 expands the duty of care beyond the Ultramares
doctrine but does not extend liability to all parties foreseeable by the
accountant. Section 552 provides that the liability of a professional who
negligently supplies false information is limited to the loss suffered:
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipi-
ent intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the informa-
tion to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.51
The drafters of the Restatement took a moderate position in the expan-
sion of liability. The Restatement extends the duty of care beyond U-
tramares and Glanzer, but only to those third parties who belong to an
identifiable group that the accountant intended to influence.5 2 Thus, it
limits negligence claims to specifically foreseen third parties, rather than
to "merely foreseeable" or "reasonably foreseeable" parties.5 3 Although
Recovery for Reasonably Foreseeable Users of Financial Statements, 13 BALT. L. REV. 301 (1984);
Note, Rosenblum, Inc. v Adler: CPA's Liable at Common Law to Certain Reasonably Foreseeable
Third Parties Who Detrimentally Rely on Negligently Audited Financial Statements, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 335 (1985); New Jersey Developments, Rosenblum v. Adler: The New Jersey Supreme Court
Expands Accountants'Liability, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 161 (1984); Comment, The Citadel Falls? -
Liability for Accountants in Negligence to Third Parties Absent Privity: Credit Alliance Corp. v. Ar-
thur Andersen & Co., 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 348 (1985); Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for
Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139
(1968).
Given the efforts of academic writers to advance tort reform in general, it is not surprising that
both the Restatement rule and the foreseeability rule have received wide acceptance by commenta-
tors. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1979; Priest, supra note 4.
49. See infra notes 84-136 and accompanying text.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
51. Id. § 552(2)(a), (b).
52. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 338, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (1983).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga.
131, 356 S.E.2d 198 (1987); Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315
(Miss. 1987); Lindner Fund v. Abney, 770 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Raritan River Steel Co.
v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988) (describing the Restatement position as
the moderate position between the privity requirement and the foreseeability rule because it does not
[Vol. 67:863
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several states have adopted the Restatement approach 54 -apparently as a
compromise position between the privity requirement55 and the foresee-
ability rule 56 -the uncertainties of the Restatement position prevent ac-
countants from estimating potential liability exposure. Similarly, prior to
litigation, third parties can only speculate whether they will be included
in the class of properly reliant financial statement users. 57
Clearly, the more radical departure from Ultramares is the foreseeabil-
ity rule, which maintains that accountants have a duty to all persons
when the auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients of the certified
statements.58 Although only a minority of states have taken this posi-
tion,59 many commentators 6° support the foreseeability rule as a proper
extension of tort reform.6'
New Jersey was the first state to adopt the foreseeability rule. In H.
require the accountant to acknowledge the reliant third party, but it does restrict liability to a limited
class).
54. See, e.g., Ingram Indus. Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.Ky. 1981); Seedkem Inc. v.
Safranek, 466 F. Supp. 340 (D. Neb. 1979); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I.
1968); Pahre v. Auditor of Iowa, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 356 S.E.2d
198 (1987); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. 1986); Haddon
View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio 2d 154, 436 N.E.2d 112 (1982); Spherex, Inc. v.
Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 454 A.2d 1308 (1982); Aluma Craft Manufacturing Co. v.
Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
55. See supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
57. Because § 552 of the Restatement does not require that the accountant acknowledge the
reliant third party and because the definition of "limited class" is vague, neither the accountant nor
the third party knows, at the time the user relies on the financial statements, whether the accountant
can be held liable to the third party for negligence. On the other hand, in jurisdictions that have
enacted accountant privity statutes, both the accountant and the reliant third party know in advance
whether the user can bring a potential negligence claim against the accountant. See infra notes 141-
44 and accompanying text.
58. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
59. See, eg., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987);
International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335
N.W.2d 361 (1983); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
60. See supra note 48. In contrast to the widespread approval in legal periodicals, the account-
ants were understandably concerned about the potential for unlimited liability. See, e.g., Collins,
Malpractice Prevention and Risk Management, J. AcCT., July 1986, at 52; Collins, Professional Lia-
bility: The Situation Worsens, J. AcCT., Nov. 1985, at 57; Gavin, Hicks & Decosimo, CPA's Liability
to Third Parties: The Risk Is Increasing, J. ACCT., June 1984, at 80; Miller, supra note 7, at 57;
Minow, Accountants' Liability and the Litigation Explosion, J. Acer., Sept. 1984, at 70.
61. See authorities cited supra note 44.
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Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler,62 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that
an accountant who fails to detect fraudulent entries in a client's financial
statements breaches a duty to all persons who he should reasonably fore-
see will receive and rely upon the report for a proper business purpose.63
The accountant in Rosenblum failed to detect fraudulent entries in the
client's financial statements. The client entered bankruptcy after using
the financial statements to induce the plaintiffs to acquire common stock
of the client. The court held that the accountant owed a duty of care to
the plaintiffs even though he was not notified that statements would be
issued to prospective investors.
Although the foreseeability rule remains the minority position, some
state courts" and numerous commentators65 have adopted and expanded
the Rosenblum rationale. Because foreseeability represents the more ex-
treme position with regard to expunging the privity requirement, the re-
mainder of this section will focus on the justifications for the rule, as well
as the oversights in such arguments.
B. Justifications for the Foreseeability Rule
To support expanded accountant liability, proponents typically com-
pare accountant liability with product liability and point to the deterrent
value of expanded liability. In addition, these commentators cast the ac-
countant in the role of public protector, presenting the third party as an
innocent investor. Finally, they argue that insurance will protect the
accountant.
1. Accountant Statements as Defective Products
Proponents of the foreseeability rule argue that because courts have
discarded privity in the defective product context,66 courts should also
permit third parties to recover from negligent accountants without a con-
tractual relationship. 67 The accountant's opinion about the accuracy of
the financial statement is the "product." Under this argument, once the
accountant inserts the product into the stream of commerce, the negli-
62. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
63. Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
64. See supra note 59.
65. See supra note 48.
66. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler 93 N.J. 324, 341, 461 A.2d 138, 147; International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at
226.
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gent accountant should be responsible to parties who justifiably relied
upon the opinion without regard to privity.68
2. Deterrent Effect of Expanded Liability
Advocates of the foreseeability rule also contend that expanding the
duty of care deters negligence. An increase in the accountant's potential
liability, they argue, will result in greater care and diligence. The Rosen-
blum court concluded that liability to all foreseeable users would en-
courage accountants to conduct more thorough audits.69 Subsequent
courts adopted this rationale, holding that a higher duty of care would
"'heighten the profession's cautionary techniques"7 and insure that ac-
countant "negligence [would not] go undeterred."7 1
3. Role of the Accountant
Proponents of the foreseeability rule also justify abandoning the privity
requirement by noting the changing perception of the accountant's role
in modern society. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., Cardozo
stated that "public accountants are public only in the sense that their
services are offered to any one [sic] who chooses to employ them."72
Fifty-five years later, when a California court adopted the foreseeability
rule in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.,7
the court noted acknowledgement by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), the self-governing body for public ac-
countants, of the accounting profession's responsibility to the public.74
International Mortgage also cited the Supreme Court's recognition of the
accountant's expanded role as the "public watchdog. '75 Advocates of
the foreseeability rule argue that the accountant's position of public trust
68. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 356, 461 A.2d at 155.
69. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
70. International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
71 Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d at 384, 335 N.W. 2d at 365.
72. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
73. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
74. "[T]he profession's responsibility to the public... has grown as the number of investors has
grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and stockholders has become more imper-
sonal, and as government increasingly relies on accounting information." International Mortgage,
177 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr at 224-25 (quoting AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
(CCH 1984) ET § 51.04 (1981)). The Court in Rosenblum also noted the accountant's increased
responsibility to the public. 93 N.J. at 346, 461 A.2d at 149.
75. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225 (quoting United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984)). See also 177 Cal. App. 3d at 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
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justifies expanded accountant liability.76
4. Third Party as Innocent Investor
Shifting the economic harm from the "innocent" creditor or investor
to the negligent accountant is another justification offered for the aban-
donment of the Ultramares privity requirement. 7  The accountant can
reasonably expect the client to distribute the financial statements for
business purposes and third parties to rely on those statements to extend
credit or invest in the business.78
Under the foreseeability rule, allowing the reliant third party to re-
cover damages from the negligent accountant shifts the loss from the
innocent creditor who can no longer collect from the insolvent client.79
The risk of loss, the argument concludes, should be placed on the ac-
counting profession, which is better able to allocate such risk to its cus-
tomers and the public."0
5. Insurance Protects the Accountant
In response to Cardozo's concerns in Ultramares regarding liability for
an indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class,8 ' advocates of the
foreseeability rule argue that insurance will protect accountants from fi-
nancial ruin. Malpractice insurance protects the accounting industry
and provides an efficient method to allocate the risk. 2 The Rosenblum
court stated that it had "no reason to believe" that accountants would be
unable to acquire malpractice insurance to cover liability to reliant third
parties resulting from negligent audits.8 3 Thus, ignoring any long-term
76. International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
77. See, e.g., Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152; International Mortgage, 177 Cal.
App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
78. See, eg., Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 356, 461 A.2d at 155; International Mortgage, 177 Cal.
App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
79. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.
80. International Mortgage, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See also Rosen.
blum, 93 N.J. at 351-52, 461 A.2d at 153 (quoting Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91
(D.R.I. 1968)).
81. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
82. See, eg., Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365; Rosenblum 93 N.J. at 349, 461 A.2d at
151.
83. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 349, 461 A.2d at 151. The court in Rosenblum based its belief that
accountants would have little difficulty obtaining insurance on a 1976 survey. Id. at 349-50 n. 11,461
A.2d at 151 n.l 1 (quoting Note, Accountants' Liability For Negligence-A Contemporary Approach
ForA Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 415 n.81 (1979)). For a more current discus-
sion of accountant malpractice insurance availability, see infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
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ramifications, the court determined that insurance would assure account-
ant survival despite indeterminate liability.
C. Weaknesses in the Foreseeability Rule Rationale
Based on commentators' predictions of the demise of the privity re-
quirement for accountant negligence claims,"4 one might infer that the
foreseeability rule was the "correct" approach. Yet continuing debate 5
and contrary holdings by various state courts8 6 demonstrate that the
foreseeability rule is not universally accepted. For each of the arguments
discussed favoring foreseeability, s7 there are several counterarguments
for retaining the accountant-privity doctrine.""
1. Accountant Statements as Defective Products
Courts have justified abandoning the privity requirement for account-
ant negligence by comparing the audit opinion to a manufacturer's prod-
uct and the third-party creditor or investor to the "innocent victim" of a
defective product.8 9 The analogy of an audit to a manufactured product,
however, is strained. The manufacturer is responsible for the production
and distribution of the manufactured product. The accountant, on the
other hand, is a secondary, rather than primary, participant in an audit. 90
The primary responsibility for a financial statement's accuracy rests with
client management.9" Thus, because the accountant must rely on the cli-
84. See supra note 48.
85. Compare authorities cited supra note 48 (commentators supporting expanded accountant
liability) with Siliciano, supra note 18 and Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Lia-
bility Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1988) (discussing problems with expanded accountant
liability).
86. Compare authorities cited supra note 42 (cases which reaffirm the privity requirement) with
authorities cited supra note 54 (cases which apply the Restatement approach) and authorities cited
supra note 59 (cases which apply the foreseeability rule).
87. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
88. One commentator has noted that the "superficial character" of the arguments supporting
the foreseeability rule continues to go unnoticed in scholarly publications. "[S]cholarly authority is
tapped selectively, and the legitimate policy arguments of those subject to the new rules are treated
with derision. In essence, a new citadel has been raised by the would-be heirs of those who long ago
successfully stormed the privity defense for defective products." Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1979-80.
89. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. See also Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1976 (the
"effort to remake the accountant in the image of the product manufacturer obscures the true charac-
teristics of the parties").
90. Mednick, Accountants' Liability: Coping With the Stampede to the Courtroom, J. ACCT.,
Sept. 1987, at 122.
91. In re Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 721 (1939). See supra notes 11-12 and
accompanying text.
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ent for necessary information, it is more difficult to control audit risk
than to control a defective manufacturing process. 92 Arguably, account-
ants themselves are at times victims of fraud by their clients.93
Compensation is another factor that distinguishes the accountant from
the manufacturer. Typically, the manufacturer is compensated based on
the value of the transaction, and thus receives compensation commensu-
rate with the relative magnitude of its potential liability. The accountant,
on the other hand, is usually paid on the basis of time spent performing
the audit. As a result, the complexity of the client's accounting system,
rather than the size of third-party transactions-unknown to the ac-
countant in any event-determines the time required to conduct an au-
dit. Under the foreseeability rule, therefore, the accountant's
compensation does not reflect the magnitude of potential third-party
transactions.94
2. Deterrent Effect of Expanded Liability
The deterrence value of abandoning the privity requirement 95 is also
disputed. Unique characteristics of the audit function diminish the de-
terrent effect of an expanded duty of care. Auditing is labor intensive
and consists of a series of subjective judgments. 96 Although a manufac-
turer can correct product defects by refining the production process, an
infinite array of subjective decisions prevents an accountant from imple-
menting a standard procedure to eliminate the risk of an errant interpre-
tation of client data.97
Additionally, the accountant already has incentives, other than poten-
tial liability, to perform careful audits. Reputation is a valuable com-
92. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1961. See generally Carmichael, The Auditor's New Guide to
Errors, Irregularities and Illegal Acts, J. ACCT., Sept. 1988, at 40.
93. Mednick, supra note 90, at 122.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
96. See generally Akresh & Tatum, Audit Sampling-Dealing With the Problems, J. AcCT.,
Dec. 1988, at 58; Callahan, Jaenicke & Neebes, SAS nos. 56 and 57. Increasing Audit Effectiveness, J.
AcCT., Oct. 1988, at 56; Conner, Enhancing Public Confidence in the Accounting Profession, J.
AccT., July 1986, at 76; Ellingsen, Pany & Fagan, SAS no. 59: How to Evaluate Going Concern, J.
AcCT., Jan. 1989, at 24; Mednick, The Auditor's Role in Society: A New Approach to Solving the
Perception Gap, J. Acer., Feb. 1986, at 70.
97. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1961-62. At some point, increasing personnel or increasing the
length of the audit may lead to increased, rather than decreased, audit risk. Increased personnel
present potential supervision problems. Extended audits increase the risk that accounting data will
become dated and thus more difficult to audit. Id. at 1962.
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modity for an accountant. Clients insist on competent audits because
they rely on the quality of information produced.98 In addition, the ac-
countant's reputation may enhance the client's ability to obtain credit.99
In a competitive service industry, incompetent accountants will not sur-
vive. 1° Proponents of the foreseeability rule have not conclusively estab-
lished that an expansion of potential plaintiffs will significantly further
deter accountant negligence.
3. Role of the Accountant
The accountant's role as "public watchdog'1°I is perhaps the least per-
suasive justification for the erosion of Ultramares. The expanded role of
public accountants since Ultramares 102 does not require abandonment of
the privity requirement. In fact, the argument that the expanded percep-
tion of the accountant's role in society justifies an expanded duty of care
is based on a misinterpretation of both the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 1o3 and the AICPA Professional
Standards. In International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp., the case through which California adopted the foreseeability rule,
the court cited both the Supreme Court's comparison of the accountant
to a "public watchdog"'" and the AICPA's acknowledgement of a re-
sponsibility to the public' 05 as authority for abandoning the privity re-
quirement. The International Mortgage court, however, failed to identify
the context of the quotes it used. 6
98. Goldberg, supra note 85, at 302.
99. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1953.
100. The AICPA, along with similar organizations for each state, seeks to protect the reputation
of the public accounting industry by regulating licensing of certified public accountants (CPAs). A
150-hour post secondary education requirement, AICPA, BYLAws § 2.2.3 (1988), a uniform exami-
nation, id. at § 2.2.2, continuing practice education, id. at § 2.3.3, and peer reviews, id. at § 2.3.4, are
examples of methods established by the AICPA to protect the public from incompetent accountants.
In addition, the AICPA sanctions substandard performances with suspension or expulsion of the
offending member. Id. at § 7.
101. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 218 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C.
629, 670-71 (1957) ("in certifying statements the accountant's duty 'is to safeguard the public inter-
est, not that of his client' ").
103. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
104. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 107-109 and accompanying
text.
105. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 110-114 and accompanying
text.
106. For example, in International Mortgage, the quote from Arthur Young begins: "An in-
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In Arthur Young, an accounting firm claimed a work-product privilege
while contesting an IRS subpoena for tax accrual work papers prepared
during an audit engagement. The Supreme Court distinguished the ac-
countant's work product from the attorney's work product 10 7 by noting
that the attorney's role as the client's advocate is to present the client's
case in the most favorable light.'0o Conversely, the Court noted that by
certifying the financial statements of the client, the CPA assumes a pub-
lic responsibility, a "public watchdog" function, which redefines the ac-
countant's role as a disinterested analyst. 109 In Arthur Young, the
Supreme Court addressed only the evidentiary issue of the accountant
work-product privilege. Consequently, Arthur Young is not persuasive
authority for extending accountant liability for negligence.
Similarly, the AICPA standards do not support the foreseeability
rule. 1 ° As the court in International Mortgage noted, the standards
promulgated by the AICPA emphasize the profession's public responsi-
bility. 1 '1 However, this responsibility to the public, read in light of the
related standards that are the philosophical foundation of the AICPA
Rules of Conduct, 12 means merely that "those who depend upon a certi-
fied public accountant.., have a right to expect.., that he is a person of
dependent certified public accountant performs a different role." International Mortgage Co. v. John
P. Butler Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The court, however, failed to
discuss the context in which the Supreme Court was defining the accountant's role. The following
discussion clarifies this context.
107. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
108. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
111. AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ET § 51.04 (CCH 1984). See supra note 74 and ac-
companying text.
112. Id. § 51.08. In fact, when International Mortgage was decided, the AICPA Rules of Con-
duct did not discuss the accountant's responsibility to the public. AICPA, BYLAWS AND RULES OF
CONDUCT 37-43 (1981). In order to promote public confidence in the accounting industry, the
AICPA amended the Code of Professional Conduct on January 12, 1988. AICPA, CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988). The new Code of Professional Conduct explicitly recognized the ac-
countant's responsibility to the public. Article II of the Code provides:
The Public Interest
Members should accept the obligation to act in a way that will serve the public interest, honor
the public trust, and demonstrate commitment to professionalism. A distinguishing mark of
a profession is acceptance of its responsibility to the public. The accounting profession's
public consists of clients, credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business
and financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of certified
public accountants ....
In discharging their professional responsibilities, members may encounter conflicting
pressures from among each of those groups. In resolving those conflicts, members should
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competence and integrity." I13 There is a substantial difference between a
responsibility to perform an audit with "competence and integrity" and
liability to all who foreseeably rely on a client's financial statements.114
4. Third Party as Innocent Investor
Casting the reliant third party in the role of innocent victim,115 while
emotionally appealing, is often unrealistic. This characterization is based
on the premise that the third party could not reduce his risk of loss.
Plaintiffs in accountant negligence suits, however, usually are sophisti-
cated commercial creditors who willingly participate in business ventures
that reward financial risk.116 Expanding the privity requirement gives
third parties a windfall guaranty. 7 Without a privity requirement, the
creditor benefits from risk reduction and the accountant bears the addi-
tional cost. The added security provided by this judicially established
guaranty creates an illogical incentive for creditors to relax their efforts
to control the risks inherent in the transaction.1 18
Available means of protection also should estop third parties from
act with integrity, guided by the precept that when members fulfill their responsibility to
the public, clients' and employers' interests are best served.
Those who rely on certified public accountants expect them to discharge their responsi-
bilities with integrity, objectivity, due professional care, and a genuine interest in serving
the public.
Id. at 4.
Thus, the accountants acknowledge a responsibility to the public to perform with objectivity and
integrity. Recognition of this duty, however, does not support the erosion of the privity doctrine.
113. AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 111, § 51.03.
114. In fact, an accountant who is not disinterested and nevertheless compromises his integrity
by issuing certified financial statements would be liable to nonprivity third parties under Ultramares
because privity is not a defense to fraud. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
116. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1955. A review of the landmark accountant liability cases sup-
ports this sophisticated creditor characterization. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Acct. Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986) (subsidiary of a major real estate
developer); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983) (owners of retail catalog
showrooms); Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.E.2d 110, 493
N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985) (major financial service company); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,
255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (corporation engaged in business as a factor); Citizens State Bank
v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983) (bank).
117. Establishing accountant liability to third parties is "equivalent to making [the accountant] a
guarantor against an elastically defined set of unfortunate events." Goldberg, supra note 85, at 296.
"The fuzzy contours of the accountant's court-determined guarantee increase the costs of providing
that guarantee. The open-endedness of the foreseeability standard and the court's temptation to fine-
tune the package by manipulating such doctrines as foreseeability, reasonable reliance, and the con-
tent of negligence makes fuzziness nearly inevitable." Id. at 306.
118. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1948. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text for a brief
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claiming helplessness. Under the Glanzer exception to Ultramares,119 a
third party can recover for accountant negligence if the purpose of the
audit was to provide information to the third party. 20 Third parties can
also contract to receive the additional assurance of certified financial
statements. 121 If the third-party chooses not to contract with the ac-
countant, numerous other methods, such as guaranties and security in-
terests in specific assets, are available to enable the third-party creditor to
obtain the desired level of assurance.1 22 Thus, creditors remain unpro-
tected third parties by choice. 123
Without the privity requirement, the accountant cannot identify reli-
ant third parties and adjust fees to reflect adequately the potential liabil-
ity exposure. Under Ultramares, third parties can obtain assurance
through contracts that define the scope of accountant liability. Given
this ability, a third party who chooses not to obtain the available assur-
ance should not gain windfall legal protection through the foreseeability
doctrine.
5. Insurance Protects the Accountant
Reliance on the insurance mechanism to protect accountants from the
indeterminate liability of the foreseeability rule124 is problematical at
best. The Rosenblum court cited insurance statistics to support its belief
that accountants could obtain malpractice insurance to cover liability to
discussion of the hazards associated with allowing third parties to recover for economic loss in gen-
eral.
The same rationale applies to individual investors as well as creditors. An individual makes a
conscious decision to accept risk when he forgoes the lower return of low-risk investments (such as
treasury bills) and seeks the higher return of more risky investments. The investor has methods to
reduce risk, such as diversification, but a guaranty from an accountant overcompensates the risk-
seeking investor in relation to the risk-averse investor by reducing the risk of high-return invest-
ments. See Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1973.
119. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
120. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.
121. See Goldberg, supra note 85, at 312 ("If investors want assurance against losses arising
from accountant negligence or other causes, they can purchase it .... The accountant's liability to
third parties should be determined entirely by voluntary agreement." (emphasis added)); Siliciano,
supra note 18, at 1956 (It is reasonable to expect the third party to contract with the accountant,
because "[i]n contrast to the product consumer, the sophisticated third party creditor in the account-
ing cases is in a direct bargaining relationship with the primary risk creator-the accountant's
client.").
122. Goldberg, supra note 85, at 305.
123. Id. at 302.
124. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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all foreseeable third parties.1 25 The court, however, failed to consider the
long-term effects of this response. A radical expansion of accountant lia-
bility, such as the abandonment of the privity requirement, will certainly
have an impact on insurance availability.
The "tort crisis" of the mid-1970s demonstrated that insurance can be
an ineffective means to support expanded liability.'2 6 Insurance premi-
ums are based on both the magnitude of potential loss and risk predict-
ability. 127  Insurers react to uncertainty in tort liability by charging
higher premiums, not only to cover higher claim payments, but also to
compensate for the risk of unanticipated losses. 128 Insurance companies
responded to expanded liability for medical malpractice and product lia-
bility during the mid-1970s by increasing premiums on many policies
several hundred percent per year. Several insurance companies went so
far as to refuse to issue some types of liability policies. 129  The severe
disruption caused by expanded medical malpractice liability during this
period 3 ' resulted in legislative intervention to ameliorate the disturbance
125. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
126. See H. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS 103-04 (1987);
Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
517 (1984).
127. Berger, The Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availability/Affordability
Crisis and Its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 285, 300 (1988).
128. Id. See also Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399,
404-05 (1987); Schmit, Insurance Versus Indemnification: An Argument for Stare Decisis, 34 DEF.
L.J. 125, 129-30 (1985). Insurers establish premiums based on past experience with similar risks.
"If the information accumulated about the experience of comparable ventures in the past is both
substantial and accurate, an actuary usually can project the average incidence and the average cost
of the harmful experience with sufficient precision for an insurer to establish an appropriate pre-
mium." R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES,
LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 1.3(b)(2) (1988). However, if liability expo-
sure increases, past experience becomes outdated and unreliable. Consequently, projection of the
average incidence and average cost of losses becomes less accurate and insurers must increase premi-
ums to compensate for the increased risk of unexpected losses.
129. Danzon, supra note 126, at 517.
130. See generally Grad, Medical Malpractice and the Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Wan-
ing Options, 36 CASE W. RES. 1058 (1986); Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice Crisis, 21 TRIAL,
May 1985, at 22; Nye, Gifford, Webb & Dewar, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An
Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEo. L.J. 1495 (1988); Redlich, End-
ing the Never-Ending Medical Malpractice Crisis, 38 ME. L. REV. 283 (1986); Redlich, Understand-
ing the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 57 N.Y. ST. B. J. Oct. 1985, at 38 (1985); Robinson, The Medical
Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Spring 1986);
Note, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure the Disease?, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 241
(1987); Note, Arbitration: An Antidote to New York's Medical Malpractice Crisis, 11 VT. L. REV. 577
(1986); Note, Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988).
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in the insurance market. 131
Expanded accountant liability already has affected accountant mal-
practice insurance. From 1984--the year after Rosenblum was de-
cided-through 1987, insurance premiums for large CPA firms increased
500%, coverage was cut in half, and deductibles were increased. 32  The
impact on smaller firms has been even greater, causing many of them to
drop insurance coverage133 or go out of business.134 Many insurance car-
riers no longer offer accountant liability insurance.1 35  In short, the ac-
countant malpractice insurance problem is nearing a crisis stage, similar
to that experienced a few years ago by the medical profession.' 36 As with
medical malpractice liability, state legislation designed to limit account-
ant liability may prove necessary to resolve the emerging accountant in-
surance crisis.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: ACCOUNTANT PRIVITY STATUTES
Although arguments for the foreseeability rule have some appeal, 137
the benefits derived from expanded accountant liability do not outweigh
the costs of allowing recovery for economic damages without a privity
131. See generally, Quinn, Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland's Response to the
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 74 (1980); Note, A Cure for the Medical Malprac.
tice Crisis, 37 ALA. L. REV. 183 (1985); Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New
York State Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Comprehen-
sive Reform, 52 BROOKLYN L. REV. 135 (1986); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Re-
sponses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417; Note, Improved Regulation of
Maine Physicians: One Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 38 ME. L. REV. 449 (1986); Com-
ment Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655 (1976); Note,
Ohio's Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or Meaningless?, 9 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 361 (1984); Note, Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Kansas Response to the Medical Mal.
practice Crisis, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 566 (1984); Note, Medical Malpractice Damage Caps: Navigating
the Safe Harbors, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 565 (1987).
132. AICPA, Everyone Pays: The Harsh Trends of Civil Suits, J. AccT, Sept. 1987, at 119.
133. Goldberg, supra note 85, at 296; AICPA, supra note 132, at 119 ("One out of five firms
responding to a recent Wisconsin Institute of CPAs survey of its members indicated that it had been
forced to drop its professional insurance coverage").
134. Goldberg, supra note 85, at 303.
135. See Berton, Small CPA Firms' Liability Rates Soar, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1985, at 6, col. 1
(of the dozens of insurance carriers that had offered coverage to small and middle-size accounting
firms, only three remain); Miller, supra note 7, at 57.
136. Siliciano, supra note 18, at 1950 ("precipitous rate surges, in turn, may trigger the fatal
'unraveling' of insurance risk pools, as those accounting firms that can best manage and regulate risk
opt out in favor of self-insurance").
137. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text. See supra notes 89-136 and accompanying
text for weaknesses in the arguments for the foreseeability rule.
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requirement. The expansion of accountant liability in some states,"'8
along with the potential for privity erosion in others, is likely to trigger
an accountant liability crisis.'3 9 State legislatures, rather than courts, are
better suited to weigh the competing policy issues and define the rights
and responsibilities of both the accountant and third parties.'" In addi-
tion, experience with medical malpractice insurance shows that legisla-
tive response to the emerging accountant insurance crisis is necessary.
The issue of accountant liability is ripe for legislative consideration.
A. Privity Statutes Provide Certainty
Three state legislatures have intervened in response to the developing
problems caused by expanded accountant liability. Illinois, 4 ' Arkan-
sas,142 and Kansas, 43 recently enacted privity statues. Although the
138. See supra notes 54 and 59.
139. See supra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
140. Without guidance from state legislatures, courts are left to decide cases and establish case
law based on equitable principles. Admittedly, time constraints, political pressures, and an inability
to predict the future prevent legislatures from enacting statutes to govern every conceivable dispute.
However, when a substantial debate over a policy issue arises, it is preferable to resolve the dispute
through the legislative process. By the time a case reaches the courts, a party has been injured and a
court must decide who will bear the loss. The legislature, however, can design a statute that specifi-
cally defines rights and duties before the harm has occured, thus making results more predictable.
In addition, statutes can correct unpopular court decisions. Danzon, supra note 126, at 517
("Statutory tort reform may be viewed as a collective choice to override the private choices reflected
in the evolution of common law").
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1 (1987), entitled "Liability-Privity of contract,"
provides as follows:
§ 30.1. No person, partnership or corporation licensed or authorized to practice under this
Act or any of its employees, partners, members, officers or shareholders shall be liable to
persons not in privity of contract with such person, partnership or corporation, for civil
damages resulting from acts, omissions, decisions or other conduct in connection with pro-
fessional services performed by such person, partnership or corporation, except for:
(1) such acts, omissions, decisions or conduct that constitute fraud or intentional misrep-
resentations, or
(2) such other acts, omissions, decisions or conduct, if such person, partnership or cor-
poration was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to
benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action; provided, however, for the
purposes of this subparagraph (2), if such person, partnership or corporation (i) identifies
in writing to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the services, and (ii) sends
a copy of such writing or similar statement to those persons identified in the writing or
statement, then such person, partnership or corporation or any of its employees, partners,
members, officers or shareholders may be held liable only to such persons intended to so
rely, in addition to those persons in privity of contract with such person, partnership or
corporation.
142. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-302 (1987), entitled "Liability of accountants," provides:
No person, partnership, or corporation licensed or authorized to practice under the Pub-
lic Accountancy Act of 1975, § 17-12-101 et seq., or any of its employees, partners, mem-
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statutes are not identical, the effect of each is essentially the same. The
statutes require the accountant, client, and third parties to determine
their respective rights and duties before the third party relies on the fi-
nancial statements. 144
Accountant privity statutes provide certainty, thus permitting all par-
ties in financial transactions to make better informed business decisions.
To the extent that expanded liability deters accountant negligence, 141 the
statutes promote efficiency because the accountants can adjust audit pro-
cedures if they know before performing the audit that they may be liable
to additional parties. Precise definition of the circumstances under
bers, officers, or shareholders shall be liable to persons not in privity of contract with the
person, partnership, or corporation for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions, deci-
sions, or other conduct in connection with professional services performed by such person,
partnership, or corporation, except for:
(1) Acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitutes fraud or intentional misrep-
resentations; or
(2) Other acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct if the person, partnership, or corpora-
tion was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit
or influence the particular person bringing the action. For the purposes of this subdivision,
if the person, partnership, or corporation:
(A) Identifies in writing to the client those persons who are intended to rely on the
services, and
(B) Sends a copy of the writing or similar statement to those persons identified in the
writing or statement, then the person, partnership, or corporation or any of its employees,
partners, members, officers, or shareholders may be held liable only to the persons intended
to so rely, in addition to those persons in privity of contract with such person, partnership,
or corporation.
143. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402 (1987), entitled "Liability for professional negligence; restric-
tions," provides:
No person, proprietorship, partnership, professional corporation or association authorized
to practice as a certified public accountant pursuant to article 3 of chapter 1 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated, or any employee, agent, partner, officer, shareholder or member
thereof, shall be liable to any person or entity for civil damages resulting from acts, omis-
sions, decisions or other conduct amounting to negligence in the rendition of professional
accounting services unless:
(a) The plaintiff directly engaged such person, proprietorship, partnership, corporation
or association to perform the professional accounting services; or
(b) (1) the defendant knew at the time of the engagement or the defendant and the
client mutually agreed after the time of the engagement that the professional accounting
services rendered the client would be made available to the plaintiff, who was identified in
writing to the defendant; and (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff intended to rely
upon the professional accounting services rendered the client in connection with specified
transactions described in writing.
144. The statutes specifically relate only to accountant negligence. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-
302(1) (1987); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1(1) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN, § 1-402 (1987).
Thus, the statutes do not change the common-law rule that privity is not a defense to fraud or
intentional misrepresentations. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Nor do the state statutes
affect suits based on federal laws. See supra note 39.
145. The deterrent effect of expanded accountant liability is questionable. See supra notes 69-71
and 95-100 and accompanying text.
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which the third parties can recover for accountant negligence permits the
client, investors, and third-party creditors to negotiate more effi-
ciently. 146 Moreover, the statutes unequivocally establish the state's po-
sition without leaving the policy determination to the courts.
B. Comparison of Enacted Privity Statutes
Because certainty is a key element of accountant privity legislation,147
the language of these statutes should specifically identify the require-
ments for third-party reliance. The Illinois, Arkansas, and Kansas stat-
utes each resolve the problem of indeterminate accountant liability by
limiting third-party negligence claims. The differences between the Illi-
nois and Arkansas statutes are insignificant.148 The Kansas statute, how-
ever, applies an alternative approach with several significantly different
requirements for third-party reliance.
Under the Illinois and Arkansas statutes, liability for negligence arises
only if the accountant was aware that the client intended to use the ac-
counting services to influence a third party. 149 Additionally, Illinois and
Arkansas limit liability to specifically identified third parties if the ac-
countant sends written notice to both the client and the third party ac-
knowledging the reliance.' 50 The Kansas statute requires written
identification of both third parties and the covered transactions. 51 Kan-
sas allows third-party identification after the time of the engagement,
provided that both the accountant and the client agree. 52 Although
neither approach is clearly superior, this section will evaluate the effec-
tiveness of each approach in terms of the certainty provided by the re-
quirements for third-party reliance.
Both approaches allow third-party recovery only if the accountant
knew that the third party would rely on the accounting services. The
146. See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text. The third party has the option to demand
inclusion in the statutorily defined group that can hold the accountant liable for negligence. The
decision to comply with the statutory requirements for inclusion in this group--like the demand for
collateral, a personal guaranty, or a higher interest rate-is determined by the third party's risk
tolerance and desired return.
147. See supra note 126-128 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 141-142. Because of the similarity, for the purposes of the following statute
comparison, the Illinois and Arkansas statutes are grouped together as one approach.
149 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-302(2) (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1(2) (1987).
150 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-302(2)(A) and (B) (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para.
5535.1(2)(i) and (ii) (1987).
151. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b) (1987).
152. Id.
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Kansas statute specifies that the accountant and client may agree either
before or after the engagement. 15 3 The Illinois and Arkansas statutes,
however, do not state when the identification of third parties must oc-
cur.154 Although accountant knowledge of third-party reliance before
the audit is sufficient to establish liability under either statute, the Illinois
and Arkansas statutes leave open the question whether the accountant
can consent after the engagement. In order to clarify the requirements of
third-party reliance, to encourage freedom of contract, and to promote
the free flow of information, future accountant privity statutes should
follow the Kansas approach and clearly specify that consent after the
engagement is sufficient to bind the accountant.
The two approaches also differ as to which transactions accountant
liability is extended. Under the Kansas statute, accountant liability to
third parties is limited to "services rendered in connection with specified
transactions described in writing." '155 In contrast, the accountant need
only be aware that the services would influence a "particular person"
under the Illinois and Arkansas statutes.I56 Limiting liability to certain
persons addresses the "indeterminate class" problem,"5 7 but does not set-
tle the concern of "liability in an indeterminate amount."158 Future ac-
countant privity statutes should follow the Kansas approach and restrict
third-party recovery to liability arising from agreements that specify both
reliant third parties and covered transactions. 1 9 This approach would
encourage agreement between the accountant, client, and third parties,
and resolve the impending accountant liability crisis by limiting the ac-
countant's exposure to determinate amounts.
Finally, the documentation requirements of the two approaches also
differ. While the Illinois and Arkansas statutes require only that the ac-
countant be "aware" that the primary intent of the client was to influ-
ence the third party,1 60  the Kansas statute demands written
153. Id. § 1-402(b)(1).
154. See supra notes 141-142.
155. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b)(2).
156. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-302(2) (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11, para. 5535.1(2) (1987).
157. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
158. Id. For example, an accountant's acquiescence to a particular bank's reliance on financial
statements to finance a small piece of machinery subjects the accountant to much less liability than
consent to allow that bank to rely on the statements while issuing unlimited loans to the client.
159. Identification of the covered transaction will not be a substantial burden once the parties
agree on which third parties can rely on the accountant's work. In fact, written transaction identifi-
cation is merely a record of the parties' intent as to the scope of intended reliance.
160. The Illinois and Arkansas statutes allow negligence suits by third parties if the accountant
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documentation of intended reliance.161 Third-party claims for account-
ant negligence, by definition, involve at least three participants: the ac-
countant, the client, and the reliant third party. In actual business
transactions, the number of participants, and therefore the possibility of
miscommunication, is likely to be greater. The Kansas approach, man-
dating a written agreement, provides a simple mechanism to reduce the
chance of misunderstanding the accountant's duty to third parties.
Although the Kansas statute requires written identification of third
parties, the accountant is not required formally to acknowledge this ex-
panded duty. The Illinois and Arkansas statutes, on the other hand, per-
mit the accountant to limit liability by sending confirmations to certain
third parties, who then are alone in being entitled to rely upon the ac-
countant's work product.162 Requiring evidence of the accountant's
knowledge that certain third parties are intended to rely on the financial
statements increases the effectiveness of the accountant privity statute.
The required confirmation of third-party reliance in Illinois and Arkan-
sas provides more certainty because the third party knows before reading
a financial statement whether he can recover from the accountant if the
statements are negligently prepared. Potential reimbursement from the
negligent accountant can then be a factor in the third party's decision to
extend credit or invest in the client.
IV. CONCLUSION
Proponents of the foreseeability rule for accountant negligence have
advanced several arguments to support their position. Defenders of the
privity requirement have advocated their position with the same vigor.
As the debate continues, the increased liability in some jurisdictions and
uncertainty in others seem likely to bring about a liability crisis in the
accounting industry. In light of the continuing debate, the most prudent
course may lie in accountant privity statutes. State legislatures are
was "aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence
the particular person bringing the action." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-302(2) (1987); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1(2) (1987). Whether or not the accountant was "aware" of a client's
intent is not always readily discernable. Thus, these provisions of the statutes do not provide cer-
tainty for the accountant or the third party. Both the Illinois and Arkansas statutes, however, have
optional provisions that provide a more definite method of liability determination before the third-
party reliance. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
161. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b)(1).
162. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1(2)(i)-(ii) (1987); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-114-
302(2)(A)-(B) (1987).
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uniquely qualified to balance the competing policy issues and establish
specific procedures for defining the scope of accountant liability to third
parties. Ironically, the issue of accountant liability has now come full
circle. Judge Cardozo suggested the solution nearly sixty years ago in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.: "[a] change so revolutionary'
... [in the accountant's duty of care] must be wrought by legislation."16 3
Eric R. Fend
163. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 187, 174 N.E. at 447.
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